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2EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
TLS certificates fulfill two critical security functions. 
First, the certificate plays a key role in authenticating 
and verifying the identity of a host, client or application. 
Second, it enables the encryption of data exchanged 
between a client and a server. To support the sensitive 
operation of identity verification, SSL/TLS certificates are 
supposed to be issued by trusted certificate authorities 
(CAs) who verify and check that companies are legitimate 
in order to reduce the risk of fraud and establish trust in a 
website or service.
However, in March 2019, the Evidence-Based Cybersecurity 
Research Group at the Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies at Georgia State University and Venafi released a 
detailed report, which offered evidence of the presence of 
a steady supply of SSL/TLS certificates on several darknet 
markets (Maimon et al. 2019). Specifically, we reported that 
SSL/TLS certificates are offered for sale either as part of 
crimeware services and products (for example, malicious 
websites and ransomware) or as a standalone product, at 
prices ranging from $260 to $1,600 (depending on the type 
of certificate and scope of additional services offered). In 
these advertisements, several vendors offered Extended 
Validation (EV) certificates for sale; these certificates 
require confirmation of the legal entity of the owner by a 
designated CA and are designed to confer the highest level 
of trust.
As a next step, we wanted to explore whether darknet 
vendors were able to deliver on their promise to supply 
EV certificates. To this end, we communicated with these 
vendors over various communication platforms between 
December 2018 and August 2019, and this report details 
our findings from this intensive research effort and outlines 
our insights.  
Our findings show that the process employed by CAs to 
validate the true identity of companies and organizations 
is problematic at best and has already been outsmarted 
by organized crime groups that operate around the world 
to issue EV certificates to nonexistent retail and financial 
organizations.    
Key research findings include: 
• Posts that promise to deliver EV certificates are 
advertised on darknet and clearnet platforms, both 
as add-on services for web design projects and as 
standalone services. 
• It is possible to buy valid EV certificates on the dark 
web for completely fictional companies—our re-
searchers were able to buy three certificates from two 
of the top 10 CAs operating in the U.S. and U.K. 
• Dark web vendors are tricking CAs by obtain-
ing fraudulent documents and using this to obtain 
legitimate government documents. Our researchers 
received legal documentation for nonexistent compa-
nies, including “Certificate of Incorporation of a Private 
Limited Company” in the U.K. and “Certificate of 
Formation of a Limited Liability Company” in the U.S.  
• Dark web vendors offering EV certificates as stand-
alone products charge more for them than those 
that sell them as part of a bundle, with prices for 
standalone EV certificates retailing between $1,000–
$15,000, compared with $100–$400 for those sold as 
part of a package of web services.
• Dark web vendors providing EV certificates as a 
standalone product are more likely to deliver. Our re-
searchers tried to purchase an EV certificate bundled 
with web services, but we received a DV certificate.
• Obtaining certificates for financial services orga-
nizations is more costly (asking price ranges from 
$10,000–$15,000) than those offered for a retail 
website (asking price ranges from $1,000–$1,500).
• At least one vendor selling EV certificates is working 
with a sophisticated organized crime group, which 
operates across several countries and communicates 
directly with CAs.
• Although a small number of certificates were pur-
chased as part of this research, CA business processes 
for evaluating identification documentation for EV 
certificates appear to be consistent across the industry, 
suggesting these tactics could be employed by a wide 
range of dark web vendors.
3BACKGROUND 
Encrypted Internet Communication, TLS 
Certificates and Certificate Authorities  
Internet communication between clients’ devices 
and servers is governed by various communication 
protocols. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), for 
example, defines how messages should be formatted 
and transmitted between computers connected to the 
internet and determines how applications and web 
servers should communicate and respond to queries. 
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is 
the secure version of HTTP. This protocol encrypts the 
internet traffic between clients’ browsers and the web 
servers they access, using one of two secure protocols: 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security 
(TLS). Both protocols use an “asymmetric” Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) system to provide confidential, 
encrypted communication between clients and servers 
by binding a “public” key and a “private” key (Kim et al. 
2017). Anything encrypted with the public key can only be 
decrypted by the private key, and vice versa.
To facilitate confidential communications with clients, 
organizations need to install SSL or TLS certificates onto 
their web servers. These certificates bind together two 
important components: either a domain or server name 
with an organizational identity and location. When installed 
on a web server, the SSL or TLS certificate activates 
the padlock, and the HTTPS protocol allows secure 
connections from a web server to a browser. 
To support the sensitive operation of identity verification, 
SSL/TLS certificates and their corresponding public and 
private encryption keys are issued by trusted CAs. CAs 
are charged with the task of employing various validation 
processes for different types of SSL/TLS certificates: 
Domain (DV), Organization (OV) and Extended (EV). DV 
and OV certificates require minimal validation while EV 
certificates require more extensive validation to ensure 
these higher-value certificates are issued only to legitimate 
companies, organizations and individuals. 
Certificate Authorities’ Issuing Process  
of EV Certificates 
In an effort to understand CAs’ issuing processes of EV 
certificates, we contacted 11 leading CAs—six of the 
top 10 in the U.S. and five of the top 10 in the U.K.—via 
phone and asked them to walk us through their verification 
process before issuing EV certificates. 
CAs are required to follow a set of industry guidelines issued 
by the CA/Browser Forum that detail the identification 
process.2 Figure 1 describes the various stages of the 
verification process. These are the steps taken by CAs and 
EV certificate applicants during each of stage of this process:  
1. Online Application: Purchasers are required to complete  
online forms and provide basic information, including:
• The full registered name of the company
• Physical address of the company in the country 
where the certificate is to be registered
• Direct contact information for the individual 
purchasing the certificate
• Details to verify that the requesting individual 
works for the purchasing organization (such as a 
letter from HR confirming employment)
2. Organizational Authentication: Once the request has 
been submitted to the CA, the CA confirms that 
the information provided is correct. This can be done 
either through a search for official documentation 
(such as articles of incorporation or chartered 
licenses) or, in the U.S., through a Professional Opinion 
Letter (POL) from an attorney.
3. Operational Existence: In addition to legal documentation, 
most CAs also cross-check the information submitted 
by the requester against a reputable, third-party 
database (such as Dun & Bradstreet or Bloomberg) to 
confirm that the organization is currently operational. 
In the U.S., CAs also verify the organization has been 
operational for at least six months (this is also verified 
through a third-party database).
44. Physical Address and Telephone Number: The CA 
cross-references the information given against official 
government databases, such as Company House in 
the U.K. or state or municipal registers in the U.S., 
to confirm that the physical address and telephone 
number provided are correct.
5. Domain Ownership: Purchasers are required to prove 
they are the legal owners of the domain they are 
seeking to get certified. CAs can either verify this by 
checking a third-party database, such as who.is, or by 
having the applicant send an email from one of the 
five following email addresses:
• Admin@YourDomainName.com
• Administrator@YourDomainName.com
• Webmaster@YourDomainName.com
• Hostmaster@YourDomainName.com
• Postmaster@YourDomainName.com
6. Verification Call: Finally the CA will call the purchasing 
individual at the number provided and reconfirm all of 
the information provided is correct.
7. Issuing the Certificate: Upon successful validation of the 
requesting organizations identify, an EV certificate is 
sent by email. 
Figure 1.  Validation Steps Taken by CA to Verify the Identity of EV Certificate Purchasers
If the processes used by trusted CAs to verify the identity 
of the requesting party can be spoofed, malicious actors 
can be issued an EV SSL/TLS certificate that delivers 
the highest levels of trust. This allows attackers to create 
malicious websites that appear more “trustworthy” to the 
user and their browser.1 Illegal online markets that populate 
the dark web may support malicious actors’ efforts to 
obtain authentic EV certificates and establish “legitimate” 
identities for the spoofed websites they build (Kim et al. 
2017; Kozak et al. 2018).
1 It is no more difficult to identify malicious traffic from a DV and OV certified website and an EV certified website. The technical challenge is the same.
5The Availability of SSL/TSL Certificates on 
Darknet Markets
Darknet markets offer the hardware, software and materials 
needed to initiate all types of cybercrime (Yip et al. 2013). 
The first report we published from this project (Maimon et al. 
2019) disclosed the presence of underground online markets 
for SSL/TLS certificates. Specifically, we reported that:  
• Five of the Tor network markets observed by our 
group offered a steady supply of SSL/TLS certificates, 
along with a range of related services and products. 
• SSL/TLS certificates are often packaged with crime-
ware services and products, such as malicious websites 
and ransomware. 
• Prices for certificates vary from $260 to $1,600, 
depending on the type of certificate and scope of 
additional services offered.
• At least one vendor on BlockBooth promises to issue 
certificates from reputable CAs. The seller also offers 
forged documentation, which allows attackers to 
present themselves as trusted U.S. or U.K. companies 
for less than $2,000. 
However, in the absence of a rigorous validation of both 
the services and products offered by these darknet 
vendors, it is difficult to assess the risk posed to online 
users by this market. Specifically, one may argue that this 
issue should be of lower concern if the ads on the darknet 
markets we have observed are posted by fraudsters who 
are not delivering the promised commodity than if the 
products are actually delivered. The second phase of our 
project explores whether darknet vendors deliver on their 
promise to supply EV certificates to interested parties, as 
well as assess the origin and quality of the products these 
vendors sell.
6RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
To accomplish our research objective, we applied for an 
Institutional Review Board2 approval for this research. Once 
approval was granted, we dived into online markets and 
hacker forums that were active on the Tor network from 
October 2018–April 2019 and searched for “for sale” 
listings of TLS certificates. 
Our research team discovered close to 70 relevant online 
market webpages on the Tor network. To explore for the 
presence of SSL- and TLS-related ads in each market, we 
typed in “TLS certificates” and “SSL certificates” in the 
search bar of each market. Exhibits 1–5 present several 
example ads our team was able to find between January 
and April 2019 (i.e., followed by the publication of our first 
report (Maimon et al. 2019)). 
Consistent with the findings reported in (Maimon et al. 2019), 
Exhibits 1–3 presents ads for SSL/TLS certificates which are 
packaged with malware and web design services. However, 
while Exhibits 1 and 2 present ads posted on Empire Market 
and Dream Market simultaneously, Exhibit 3 presents an ad 
posted on Bitify, a clearnet online market platform
Exhibit 1. SSL Certificates Sold Along with Malware Services on Empire Market
2 An institutional review board is a type of committee that applies research ethics by reviewing the methods proposed for research to ensure they are ethical.
7Exhibit 2. SSL Certificates Sold Along with Web Design Services on Dream Market
8Exhibit 3. SSL Certificates Sold Along with Web Design Services on Bitify
Similarly, Exhibits 4–5 present ads posted by vendors 
who promise to issue certificates from reputable CAs. 
However, while Exhibit 4 presents an ad posted on 
BlockBooth, a darknet market platform, Exhibit 5 presents 
an ad posted on Bitify.
9Exhibit 4. EV Certificates for U.K. and U.S. Companies BlockBooth—a Listing Platform  
on Open Bazaar
Exhibit 5. EV Certificates for Australian Companies on Bitify
Upon discovery of the above ads, as well as other ads that 
are not reported here but are available from the authors 
upon request, we randomly contacted two vendors—one 
who advertised the issuance of SSL/TLS certificates along 
with a web design service and the other who advertised 
EV certificate for sale—in order to assess whether their 
advertisements are truthful. Below, we describe our 
interactions with a darknet market vendor who advertised 
the issuance of SSL/TLS certificates along with a web design 
service as well as our assessment of the product he provided 
to the group. Additionally, we elaborate on the interactions 
we had with a vendor who advertised EV certificates for sale 
on both clearnet and darknet underground markets, detailing 
our assessment of the products provided. 
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RESULTS
Case Study 1: Web Design Service for an 
Online Retail Platform 
Approaching and Building Trust 
The vendor we approached with a request to design a 
retail website with an EV certificate installed on it preferred 
to be contacted by potential customers over Telegram. 
Exhibit 6 presents a screenshot of the initial interaction 
between our research group (in green) and the vendor 
(in white). Since the vendor offered several services, we 
chose the package that was relevant to our needs in the 
context of this study and asked that our website include 
a function that allows a user to open an account, log in 
with a username and password and provide a response to 
a CAPTCHA.3 We also asked for an EV certificate to be 
installed on the website. When we asked the vendor what 
our new website could be used for, the response we got 
suggested utilizing it as a platform to run online scams and 
steal targets’ cookies and passwords. 
Exhibit 6. Approaching a Vendor Over Telegram
Negotiating 
The vendor’s response to our first query was prompt. 
After receiving our requirements for the desired website 
and the need for an EV certificate, the vendor mentioned 
that an annual fee will be required to install and maintain 
the certificate. An updated price (between $200–$400) 
was sent to us with an agreement to use an escrow 
service4 to complete the business transaction. The vendor 
promised that the complete website, including the EV 
certificate installed on it, would be delivered within two 
weeks from the time of payment. The vendor’s available 
methods of payment were money transfers to either a 
PayPal account or a Bitcoin wallet. An installment plan was 
agreed upon (to build trust), and the first payment was 
sent to the vendor.  
Product Arrival 
A link to our newly purchased website arrived over 
Telegram about eight days after we sent our first payment. 
Exhibit 7 presents a screenshot of this website. We deleted 
the website URL as well as few other identifying details in 
effort to protect our team’s safety. 
3 CAPTCHA is a type of challenge–response test used in computing to determine whether the user is human or a bot. 
4 Online escrow service is a third-party website/platform which could be used to securely conduct online transactions. Specifically, this service allows customers to 
avoid sending their payments directly to a seller, and instead to an Escrow company. The use of an escrow company services insure that it is only after the customer 
has received the product funds will be released to the seller. 
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Exhibit 7. Website Designed by Darknet Vendor and Delivered to Research Team
Quality and Authenticity Assessment 
To assess the quality of the product we received from the 
vendor, we performed two checks. First, we attempted 
to establish an account on the website, and second, we 
examined the type of TLS certificate that was installed. 
Results from these investigations yielded two key findings:
1. Although creating an account on the new website was 
feasible, no CAPTCHA banner was prompted to a 
user who attempted to log in to the account.
2. The type of TLS certificate installed on the website 
was of a DV type and not EV. Exhibit 8 presents a 
screenshot of the certificate installed on the website. 
In order to assess whether the DV certificate was installed 
on the website by mistake, we contacted the vendor and 
asked him to explain why an EV certificate was not installed 
on the website. The vendor replied the following day and 
explained the DV certificate is installed on the website 
temporarily, until the EV certificate is delivered and installed. 
However, in order for the EV certificate to be installed, we 
were asked by the vendor to send the second payment 
installment directly to his Bitcoin wallet; we were promised 
that the funding would be used to cover the EV certificate 
costs. Unsurprisingly, once we paid the second installment, 
the vendor disappeared and stopped responding to our 
queries and messages.
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Exhibit 8. DV Certificate Installed on the Website Designed by a Darknet Vendor
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Case Study 2: Obtaining EV Certificates for 
U.K.-Based Organizations  
Retail Website 
Approaching and Building Trust 
After our experience working with the previous vendor, we 
were keen to find a vendor with whom we could establish 
greater trust. Online markets allow people to rate vendors and 
disclose their transactions, which helps increase trust among 
potential customers. We were eager to find a vendor with an 
established presence on both clearnet and darknet markets. 
The vendor we approached with a request to purchase EV 
certificates preferred to be contacted by potential customers 
via email, Skype or Telegram. By investigating this vendor’s 
group of followers on one of the markets,5 our research 
team was able to map the online social network of the 
vendor and assess the online business ecosystem within 
which EV certificates were being sold.6 Figure 2 presents the 
first order (i.e., users followed by or being followed by the 
vendor directly) and second order (i.e., users followed by or 
being followed by the vendor’s followers) connections of the 
vendor we approached (market with large blue circle).  
Figure 2. Vendor First and Second-Order Connections (N = 742)
Nodes highlighted are those with greatest betweenness centrality. Colors indicate the communities (subgroups) that nodes belong to. 
Communities rely on the Girvan-Newman algorithm, which identifies groups of individuals who have in-group connections and few out-
group connections.
5 Similar to social media platforms like Twitter, some clearnet and darknet platforms allow users to “follow” and be “followed” by other users of the platform. 
6 Unfortunately, we couldn’t create a similar social network for the first vendor discussed in Case Study 1 due to absence of relevant information in the market 
platform that was employed by the vendor.
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All in all, the overall size of the vendor social network is 
composed of 742 actors; 65 vendors and customers are 
directly connected to the vendor and another 677 are 
following or are being followed by the vendor’s followers. 
Importantly, three key vendors seem to be central to this 
network. Those three key vendors are represented by 
large red, green and light green circles.  The large red circle 
(306 followers and following) represents a vendor who 
specializes in selling soft and hard illegal drugs (for example, 
Dutch MDMA crystals, Colombian cocaine and “Green 
Heineken” ecstasy). Some of the countries this vendor 
serves include Germany, U.K., Poland, Canada, Australia and 
Brazil. The large green dot (288 followers and following) 
represents a vendor who specializes in selling counterfeit 
brand products from China (for example, sunglasses and 
wallets). Finally, the large light green circle (238 followers 
and following) represents a vendor claiming to be a small 
business from Canada (Quebec) that specializes in selling 
seeds (almonds, pumpkins, cranberries and cashews). 
This social network demonstrates that both legitimate 
and illegitimate actors may have exposure to the unique 
underground market of TLS certificates.  
Consistent with the platform used for contacting the 
first vendor, this vendor preferred to be contacted over 
Telegram. We shared a request to explore a potential 
purchase of an EV certificate for a U.K.-based retail website 
at first, and the vendor responded rapidly. He indicated that 
the prices advertised on the ad (between $1,000–$1,500) 
are lower than the actual prices he charges for those 
certificates and that the price varies based on the (1) 
type of retail the certificate would be used for, (2) the 
issuing CA and (3) the country in which the certificate will 
be issued. Depending on the customer’s needs and the 
order level of complexity, the time it takes to complete an 
order can very from a few days up to a month and a half. 
Payment could only be made using cryptocurrency coins, 
such as Bitcoin, Litecoin and Ethereum.  
Negotiating 
Drawing on our experience with the first vendor, we decided 
to request that the second vendor provide an EV certificate 
for a basic retail website we had created, which could 
support potential customers’ online payments for various 
products they could buy directly from the website. We 
insisted on using an online escrow company service in this 
transaction and asked whether we could be given a discount. 
The vendor agreed to work with an online escrow company 
but refused to provide a discount, explaining that this 
operation is performed by a group of people. Accordingly, 
each member of the team is charged with handling different 
aspects of the operation, including verification and issuance 
of the certificates. The vendor assured the research team 
that his group is experienced and disclosed that he has 
successfully completed many projects in the past. Our 
request for an installment plan was approved.
Modus Operandi
Once agreement was reached between our group and the 
vendor, we were asked to provide an entity name and URL 
link for the website on which the EV certificate should be 
installed. The requested information was sent to the vendor, 
along with our first payment. The vendor thanked us and 
promised to be in touch within a few days.
Several days after we placed the order, our group received 
a dossier of official documents from the Registrar of 
Companies in England and Wales. The documents enclosed 
indicated the formation of a new company, which carried 
the entity name we provided to the vendor in the U.K. 
(importantly, although we received a digital copy of these 
documents, a hard copy version could also be mailed to 
a physical address). Exhibits 9 and 10 present two of the 
three official certificates we received from the vendor. In 
addition to the new company name, these documents 
included the names of the filing individual, as well as a 
physical address for the new company.7 Those details were 
cross-verified with the U.K. Companies House website  
(www.companieshouse.gov.uk) and were found to exist on 
those official databases. 
7 We removed sensitive details from the two documents shown in Exhibits 9 and 10 in order to protect the safety and privacy of all personal involved in this 
research both as subjects and as researchers.
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Exhibit 9. Certificate of Incorporation Document for a U.K.-Based Retail Website
Exhibit 10. Certificate of Registration for U.K.-Based Retail Website
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In an effort to increase the legitimacy of the new retail 
entity he created, the vendor also obtained a Data 
Universal Numbering System (D-U-N-S) number from 
Dun and Bradstreet, a U.S.-based company that provides 
commercial data, analytics and insights for businesses and 
maintains a database of more than 300 million business 
records worldwide. Exhibit 11 presents a screenshot of 
the new entity record on the Dun and Bradstreet website. 
Importantly, the physical address reported on Dun and 
Bradstreet’s website for the entity matches the one 
reported on the U.K. Companies House website.
Exhibit 11. Registration of U.K.-Based Retail Company on the Dun and Bradstreet Website
Upon receiving these documents, the second installment 
was sent to the vendor. In addition, and per the vendor’s 
request, we allowed the vendor access to the email server 
on which our website was installed. It was at that time that 
an official request for an EV certificate was submitted by 
the vendor to the CA. Exhibit 12 presents the confirmation 
email we received for the EV certificate request submitted 
by the vendor. 
17
Exhibit 12. Conformation Email from CA for the Receipt of an EV Certificate Request to 
be Installed on a U.K.-Based Retail Website
Several days followed after the confirmation email, and 
after a series of confirmation activities taken by the 
vendor, we received an approval email for the issuance of 
an EV certificate to our U.K.-based retail website, along 
with the EV certificate. Exhibit 13 presents a screenshot 
of the email. 
Exhibit 13. Confirmation Email from CA for the Approval of an EV Certificate Request
Once the EV certificate was approved, the vendor notified 
the research team and asked for the final payment 
installment. We then installed the certificate on the website. 
Exhibit 14 presents a screenshot of the website prior to the 
installation of the EV certificate, and Exhibit 15 shows the 
website after the installation of the EV certificate. 
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Exhibit 14. U.K.-Based Retail Website Appearance Prior to the Installation of an EV 
Certificate Presenting No Padlock and Company Location
Exhibit 15. U.K.-Based Retail Website Appearance Presenting a Green Padlock and 
Company Location After the Installation of an EV Certificate
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Quality and Authenticity Assessment 
To assess the quality of the product we received from the 
vendor, we performed two checks. 
First, we checked for the presence of the green padlock 
icon and the new entity name in the address bar. Second, 
we searched for the website identity and technical details of 
the EV certificate, which are disclosed on the website. 
As may be observed in Exhibit 15, the installation of the 
EV certificate on our website resulted in the appearance 
of the green padlock in the address bar. In addition, the 
new entity name was also showing to the right of the 
green padlock (this detail is deleted from the image 
in order to protect the safety of both the vendor and 
research team). Exhibit 16 presents a screenshot of the 
EV certificate details, as disclosed on the website. Note 
that the details enclosed by this banner reveal the validity 
and truthfulness of the certificate.  
Exhibit 16. Details of EV Certificate as It Appeared on U.K.-Based Retail Website
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Financial Institution 
Approaching 
The vendor’s success in delivering an EV certificate for the 
U.K.-based retail website was surprising to our group. This 
vendor and his team obviously have a proficient process 
for obtaining real EV certificates for non-existent entities. 
We wanted to test this further by seeing if the vendor 
would issue a certificate for a nonexistent financial services 
institution, as this is a highly regulated industry. A financial 
services website, such as one for a bank or payday loan 
company, could be used to steal even more sensitive 
information—including salary, address, bank details and so 
forth. This would make it an even more valuable phishing 
site than a retail site. 
Moreover, since the vendor advertised in his post that his 
team could deliver EV certificates from several CAs, we 
wondered if a similar modus operandi would be followed 
in obtaining an EV certificate from a different CA than the 
one used for the retail shop case. Therefore, we reached 
out to the vendor again and asked him to provide us with a 
quote for a U.K.-based online payday loan website. 
The vendor responded to our inquiry by emphasizing that 
the verification for financial-type websites is longer than 
the one for the retail website and requires more work 
and team effort. However, he assured us that his team 
had experience issuing EV certificates for a wide range 
of websites, including shopping, digital products, hosting 
companies, and even investment and bank websites. The 
price for this work was significantly higher and ranged 
between $10,000–$15,000. 
Negotiation 
Similar to the negotiation we had with this vendor during 
the first purchase of an EV certificate, negotiation for an 
EV certificate for the second website focused on the use 
of an online escrow company in this transaction as well 
as a payment installment plan. Our requests to work with 
an escrow company and for an installment plan were 
approved by the vendor. No discount was provided for the 
initial selling price.  
Modus Operandi
Once agreement was reached between our group and the 
vendor, we were asked to provide both an entity name and 
URL link for the website on which the EV certificate should 
be installed. The requested information was sent to the 
vendor, along with the first payment installment. 
A few days after we placed the order, our group received 
a dossier of official documents from the Registrar of 
Companies in England and Wales, which indicated the 
formation of a new company that carried the entity 
name we provided to the vendor (we have not provided 
screenshots of those pieces of documentation in this report 
since they are similar to those presented in Exhibits 9 and 
10). The documents included the new financial institution 
name and the name of the filing individual, as well as a 
physical address for the new company. Those details were 
cross-verified with the U.K. Companies House website and 
were found to exist on this official database. 
To check whether a D-U-N-S number was issued for the 
new financial institution, we visited the Dun and Bradstreet 
website (https://www.dnb.com/) and searched the databases 
for evidence indicating the formation of our new company. 
Exhibit 17 presents a screenshot of the new entity record 
on the website. The physical address reported on the Dun 
and Bradstreet website for the entity was similar to the one 
reported on the U.K. Companies House website. 
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Exhibit 17. Registration of U.K.-Based Financial Institution on Dun and Bradstreet Website
Upon receipt of these documents, we sent the second 
installment to the vendor. In addition, and per the 
vendor’s request, we allowed the vendor access to the 
email server on which our financial website was installed. 
It was at that time that an official request for an EV 
certificate was submitted by the vendor to the CA. A 
few days after the confirmation email, and after a series 
of confirmation activities were taken by the vendor, we 
received an approval email for the issuance of an EV 
certificate to our U.K.-based financial website, along with 
the EV certificate. Exhibit 18 presents a screenshot of 
the email. 
Exhibit 18.  Conformation Email from a CA for the Approval of an EV Certificate Request 
for a U.K.-Based Financial Institution Website
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Once the EV certificate was approved, we were notified 
by the vendor and asked to send the final installment. We 
then installed the certificate on the website and checked its 
quality and authenticity. 
Quality and Authenticity Assessment 
In line with our assessment of the first EV certificate we 
received from the vendor, we first checked for the presence 
of the green padlock icon and the new entity name in the 
address bar. 
As may be observed in Exhibit 19, the installation of the EV 
certificate on our website resulted in the appearance of the 
green padlock in the address bar. In addition, the new entity 
name also showed to the right of the green padlock (this 
detail is deleted from the image in order to protect the 
safety of both the vendor and research team). 
Exhibit 19. U.K.-Based Financial Institution Website Appearance After the Installation of 
an EV Certificate
We also searched for the EV certificate details, which are 
disclosed on the website. Exhibit 20 presents a screenshot 
of the EV certificate details, as disclosed on the website. 
Note that the details enclosed by this banner reveal the 
validity of the certificate. 
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Exhibit 20. Details of EV Certificate as It Appeared on U.K.-Based Financial  
Institution Website
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Case Study 2: US 
Approaching and Building Trust 
The vendor’s success in delivering two EV certificates for 
U.K.-based businesses’ websites was concerning to our 
group. However, since the vendor advertised his team 
could deliver EV certificates from numerous CAs in several 
countries, we wondered if a similar method of operation 
would be employed while obtaining an EV certificate to 
a financial institution website that operates in the U.S. 
Therefore, we reached out to the vendor again and asked 
him to provide us with a quote for a U.S.-based online 
loans and payday website. 
The vendor responded to our inquiry by emphasizing that 
the verification for a financial-type website in the U.S. would 
be complicated and would require a larger team than the 
one operated in the U.K. Verification for the company 
would have to be done using official documentation from 
Delaware, and the price for obtaining an EV certificate 
for a U.S.-based financial institution would range between 
$6,000–$8,500. The vendor reassured our team that his 
group is quite experienced working in the U.S. 
Negotiating 
Consistent with the negotiation we had with this 
vendor during our previous purchases of EV certificates, 
negotiation for the purchase of an EV certificate for the 
U.S.-based website focused on our team’s desire to use 
an online escrow company in this transaction as well as 
a payment installment plan. Our requests to work with 
an escrow company and for an installment plan were 
approved by the vendor. No discount was provided for the 
initial selling price.  
Modus Operandi
Once an agreement was reached between our group 
and the vendor, we were asked by the vendor to provide 
both an entity name and URL link for the website on 
which the EV certificate should be installed. The requested 
information was sent to the vendor, along with the first 
payment. A few days after we placed the order, our 
group received a dossier of official documents from the 
Division of Corporations in Delaware, which indicated the 
formation of a new company that carried the entity name 
we provided to the vendor. Exhibits 21 and 22 present 
the two official documents we received from the vendor. 
The documents included the new financial institution 
name and the name of the filing individual, as well as a 
physical address for the new company. Those details were 
cross-verified with the website and were found to exist 
on those official databases. 
Exhibit 21. Certificate of Formation Document for a U.S.-Based Financial Institution Website
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Exhibit 22. Statement of Authorized Person to U.S.-Based Financial Institution Website
To check whether a D-U-N-S number was issued for 
the new financial institution, we visited the Dun and 
Bradstreet website and searched the databases for 
evidence indicating the formation of our new company. 
Exhibit 23 presents a screenshot of the new entity record 
on the website. The physical address reported on the Dun 
and Bradstreet’s website for the entity was similar to the 
one reported in the Delaware Division of Corporations. 
Exhibit 23. Registration of U.S.-Based Financial Institution on Dun and Bradstreet Website
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Upon receipt of these documents, we sent the second 
installment to the vendor. In addition, and per the vendor’s 
request, we allowed the vendor access to the email 
server on which our financial institution website was 
installed. It was at that time that an official request for an 
EV certificate was submitted by the vendor to the CA. 
A few days after the confirmation email and a series of 
confirmation activities taken by the vendor, we received 
an approval email for the issuance of an EV certificate 
to our U.S.-based financial institution website, along with 
the EV certificate. Exhibit 24 presents a screenshot of the 
approval email. 
Exhibit 24 Conformation Email from a CA for the Approval of an EV Certificate 
Request for a U.S.-Based Financial Institution Website
Once the EV certificate was approved, we were notified by 
the vendor and asked to send the final installment. We then 
installed the certificate on the website and checked the 
quality and authenticity of the certificate.
Quality and Authenticity Assessment 
In line with our assessment of the previous EV certificates 
we received from the vendor, we first checked for the 
presence of the green padlock icon and the new entity 
name in the address bar. 
As may be observed in Exhibit 25, the installation of the EV 
certificate on our website resulted in the appearance of the 
green padlock in the address bar. In addition, the new entity 
name also showed to the right of the green padlock (this 
detail is deleted from the image in order to protect the safety 
of both the vendor and research team). We also searched for 
the EV certificate details which are disclosed on the website. 
Exhibit 26 presents a screenshot of the EV certificate details, 
as disclosed on the website. Note that the details enclosed 
by this banner reveal the validity of the certificate. 
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Exhibit 25. U.S.-Based Financial Institution Website Appearance After the Installation 
of an EV Certificate
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Exhibit 26. Details of EV Certificate as It Appeared on U.S.-Based Financial  
Institution Website
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DISCUSSION  
An EV SSL/TLS certificate is designed to be the most 
trusted certificate on the market and is issued by CAs that 
follow a rigorous validation process aimed at identifying 
the requester’s true identity. Specifically, the CA/Browser 
Forum and Microsoft guidelines for obtaining an EV 
certificate require that the requester provide multiple 
pieces of identifying information, including the company’s 
D-U-N-S number (unique numeric identifiers assigned 
to a single business entity) or a letter from a certified 
public accountant who can verify the legitimacy of the 
business, when a certificate is requested. After submitting 
the request, the CA is required to authenticate the legal 
existence and identity of the requesting party by verifying 
the company’s trade name and its operational and physical 
existence, as well as its ownership of the domain name. 
Evidence presented in this report indicates that at least 
one international organized crime group has been able 
to exploit the unique problems embedded within the EV 
validation process used by CAs, and this group is able to 
issue EV certificates for websites of nonexistent retail and 
financial institutions in both the U.K. and U.S. Specifically, 
these online vendors harness their knowledge of CA 
validation processes to sell EV certificates to interested 
parties. This discovery is a result of an extensive research 
effort through which three EV certificates for nonexistent 
retail and financial organizations were sold to our team. 
The findings presented in this report add to the ongoing 
debate regarding the effectiveness and necessity of EV 
certificates in increasing trust among internet users. 
Specifically, our findings verify James Burton’s (2017) 
experiment yet take it to the next level by exposing that at 
least one organized crime group now gets EV certificates 
from a legitimate CA and sells them on both clearnet and 
darknet markets. Burton’s suggestion that malicious actors 
could get access to credentials off the dark web, use those 
to set up a fake company and then purchase a fake domain 
and an EV SSL to secure that domain, is now a reality, which 
law enforcement agencies and governmental agencies such 
as the Federal Trade Commission should address. 
Based on these findings, we believe CAs could do more 
to validate the authenticity of individuals and organizations 
purchasing EV certificates to ensure they retain their 
value. For example, a more thorough verification of the 
EV certificate purchaser’s physical presence could be 
followed. Exhibits 27 and 28 present the street view from 
the addresses that appeared in the registration documents 
and the Dun and Bradstreet database for the U.K.-based 
retail and financial companies. Exhibit 29 presents the 
street view from the address that appeared in both the 
Delaware Division of Corporations registration documents 
and the Dun and Bradstreet database for the U.S.-based 
financial institution. Evaluating this data could improve the 
EV certificate validation process. Failure to adjust these 
processes calls into question the necessity of purchasing 
EV certificates and their value in delivering additional levels 
of trust. Future improvements should take an evidence-
based cybersecurity approach and include consistent tests 
that evaluate potential problems and weaknesses in the 
validation process. 
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Exhibit 27. Street View from the U.K. Retail Company’s Address Submitted to 
Authorities by Vendor and Appeared on Certificate of Registration Document from 
Google Maps
Exhibit 28. Street View from U.K.-Based Financial Institution’s Address Submitted to 
Authorities by Vendor and Appeared on Certificate of Registration Document from 
Google Maps 
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Exhibit 29. Actual Site on U.S.-Based Financial Institution’s Address, Which Was 
Submitted to Authorities by Vendor from Google Maps
An evidence-based cybersecurity approach provides an 
ideal framework for conceptualizing an interdisciplinary 
problem like online crime because it stresses moving 
beyond decision makers’ political, financial and social 
backgrounds as well as personal experiences to a model 
in which policy decisions are made based on scientific 
research findings. Moreover, this approach draws on 
the assumption that solutions to human behaviors may 
be affected by the interconnected behavior of victims, 
offenders and law enforcement agencies operating within 
the cyber realm, and that the effectiveness of the different 
interventions in achieving its goals should be assessed 
through rigorous scientific research methods. Seeking 
to collect and produce evidence from each of the key 
junctures formed through the online interaction between 
the different actors that operate on the cybercrime 
ecosystem and drive CA online fraud victimization will 
result in a more effective validation process. In turn, 
this will allow effective prevention and mitigation of 
cybercrime incidents.
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